Indigenous Peoples’ Place in Québec Parliamentarianism

Article 5 / 8 , Vol. 47 No. 3 (Autumn)
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Indigenous Peoples’ Place in Québec Parliamentarianism

The historically difficult relationships between Indigenous nations and government institutions resulting from the European colonization have led many Indigenous people to mistrust and feel alienated from the provincial political system. Even today, their voter turnout is lower than that of the general population. For some Indigenous people, engaging in Québec’s political system is tantamount to legitimizing a regime they do not acknowledge as their own, which could compromise the affirmation of Indigenous nations as distinct polities. In this article, the author looks to New Zealand to show how certain structural measures, such as the creation of reserved electoral divisions and the adoption of a mixed-member proportional voting system, can promote Indigenous Peoples’ participation in the democratic system while still affirming their specificity. The author notes that a reform of the voting system, as was considered in Québec during the 42nd Legislature, could provide an opportunity to adopt measures aimed at promoting the political representation of Indigenous people in the Assemblée nationale. *This article is a revised version of an essay completed as part of the Assemblée nationale’s 2022–2023 program for student pages. It represents the author’s views and does not reflect those of the Assemblée nationale du Québec or its employees.

Marianne McNicoll

Marianne McNicoll holds a bachelor’s degree in law from Université Laval. She will complete her Barreau du Québec professional training with the Assemblée nationale’s Direction de la séance et de la procédure parlementaire.

Introduction

In a democratic political system, a parliament must “reflect the social diversity of the population.”1 An assembly’s failure to be representative can undermine the quality of public life and the stability of the political system by making certain communities feel marginalized or even excluded from the political process. In many countries, Indigenous Peoples have experienced burdening, painful colonization, the consequences of which are still visible today.2 In Québec and Canada, Indigenous communities still feel excluded from the provincial and federal political systems. They consider themselves independent from a system imposed on them and that is heavily influenced by values that are foreign to them.3 These feelings have resulted in high abstention rates in elections and an extremely low number of Indigenous elected officials at both levels of government.

In spite of this political marginalization, in many parts of the world there is a democratic rebirth characterized by a growing recognition of Indigenous issues. This new engagement in participation gives us an opportunity to address the complex relationship that Indigenous communities in Québec have with democratic institutions, and to look at the institutional and legal mechanisms that can be established to foster their integration into Québec democracy. Measures, such as New Zealand’s creation of reserved seats for the Māori, show that amidst colonial alienation and refusal to endorse state power, it is nonetheless possible to assert a distinct Indigenous identity to confront the colonial state from within and indigenize it without adopting an entirely antagonistic stance.4 However, the counterexample of Nova Scotia, where the law has stated since 1992 that the legislature intends to include an additional member to represent the Mi’kmaq nation, shows that a feeling of colonial alienation on the part of Indigenous people can compromise initiatives of this nature.

I. The Relationships Between Indigenous Peoples and Canadian and Québec Politics

The legal relationships between a state and the Indigenous nations living on its territory differ from other state-citizen relationships5 because they give rise to nation-to-nation relations. In Calder,6 the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out that Indigenous rights are sui generis because “when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries.”

Historically, the first European observers who landed on Canadian soil described Indigenous societies in a way that exculpated their civilizing aims; they did not try to describe the true socio-political reality.7 However, works by contemporary historians such as Olive Patricia Dickason have set the record straight and shown how the great cultural diversity of the founding peoples was reflected in the way they governed themselves.8 Indigenous leaders’ real power came from the exemplarity of their conduct and their ability to bring people together; a title was more than just an institutional sanction of authority. But traditional Indigenous political, societal and cultural systems were progressively put in a position of subordination as Canadian society was constructed.9 Indigenous ancestral institutions were [translation] “grappling with state coercion and unavoidable cultural changes”10 brought about by policies forcing Indigenous people to become Canadian citizens.11

Throughout the history of Canada, the government has made its electoral system, which is based on Westminster’s first-past-the-post approach, a key element of its aboriginal assimilation policy.12 The Indian Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5) initially imposed representative democracy on Indigenous Peoples by replacing their traditional structures of governance with elected band councils.13 The measures establishing the election of chiefs were met with strong resistance, but the federal government considered that elected Indigenous government would force the communities to abandon their traditional political systems and that this would foster their social progress.14 These policies ended up eroding Indigenous Peoples’ traditional institutions of governance.15 It is also important to note that, from 1857 to 1960, Indigenous constituents who wanted to exercise their right to vote during federal elections had to give up their “Indian” status.

In the Canadian constitutional order, Indigenous people fall under the exclusive legislative competence of the federal Parliament. This allows the federal government to regulate their lifestyle;16 the corollary is that the federal government is responsible for the majority of public spending on Indigenous people.17 The main consequence for the provinces is that provincial legislators are prevented from being able to have an impact on essential aspects of “Indianness”.18 Since Indigenous issues are not the responsibility of the federated entities,19 a sort of legal vacuum is created, which results in Indigenous People distrusting the provinces as interlocutors to whom they can bring their claims.20

This constitutional division of powers relegates Indigenous Peoples to “mere pauper wards of the government.”21 It also strengthens the feeling that provincial legislation, programs and services, since they are designed to be the same for all, are not suited for Indigenous People,22 and do not take Indigenous specificities into consideration.23 The result of this is that the protection for Indigenous Peoples’ unique status as founding peoples is weakened. Historically, Indigenous People have therefore viewed provincial political regimes as yet another tool of domination and oppression, and for many Indigenous thinkers, voting almost amounts to legitimizing the colonial system.24

The electoral processes of Canada and Québec have very little to do with Indigenous traditions,25 and most First Nations do not encourage their members to participate in them.26 This creates a divide between Canadian institutions (whether federal or provincial) and the institutions of the various Indigenous nations. According to Élections Québec, in the 2018 Québec provincial election, Indigenous communities’ voter turnout was only 12 per cent while the turnout of Quebecers in general was 66 per cent.27 When asked by Le Devoir about the low turnout, Ghislain Picard, Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, provided some interesting insights on the factors limiting Indigenous participation in Québec’s democratic process.

He began by pointing out that Québec was the last province in Canada to grant Indigenous Peoples the right to vote, in May 1969;28 therefore, their enfranchisement is relatively new. He then explained that under the Constitution and the Indian Act, the federal government is their main interlocutor,29 which is why Indigenous communities’ relationship with the federal government is stronger than with the Québec government. The reporter also interviewed Kahsennenhawe Sky-Deer, Chief of Kahnawake, who neatly summed up the reasons behind low Indigenous voter turnout: [translation] “We don’t participate in elections outside our system of governance.”30

According to Professor Mathieu Arsenault, while some Indigenous People believe that they need to vote to influence Québec politics, others consider that voting would diminish their sovereignty and affect their pursuit of self-determination.31 According to Prof. Arsenault, low voter turnout does not mean that Indigenous communities do not want their interests taken into account; he argues instead that reconciliation requires representation mechanisms that will allow Indigenous people to talk about their issues and have real power within Québec democracy.

According to researcher Mercédez Roberge, Indigenous people’s lack of real access to decision- making circles makes it difficult for them to exercise their protected political rights and make claims to obtain new ones.32 How can an end be put to the discrimination and inequalities that these communities experience when they are not part of political decision-making in Québec? Is it possible, or desirable, to support Indigenous Peoples’ affirmation of their specificity while fostering their democratic participation in the Assemblée nationale? These are thorny questions, but we can look at New Zealand’s experiences for instructive examples of how they may be addressed.

II. Legal Solutions Adopted in New Zealand

Like Canada, New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with a British-style parliamentary system.33 The Māori people, the country’s first inhabitants, suffered greatly from the consequences of Great Britain’s colonization and quickly became a minority, representing 16.5 per cent of New Zealanders today. However, unlike Indigenous people in Québec, the Māori have benefited from direct representation in the New Zealand Parliament for over a hundred years.

On February 6, 1840, New Zealand officially became a British colony after the British and the Māori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi. While the Treaty was initially drafted to ensure the protection of the first inhabitants’ rights, its provisions were quickly violated.34 In 1852, the British Parliament adopted the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 72). Section 71 of the Act recognized the rights of the Māori to a sort of self-government in certain districts where their “laws, customs, or usages should be so observed.”35 Yet, their rights were never respected, and this marked the beginning of the political and social marginalization of the Māori nation.36 As certain authors have stated, at the time, the two peoples “… formed two separate communities within a single country”.37

This duality and these tensions can be explained by the fact that the first inhabitants did not have the right to vote. The Constitution Act 1852 provided that only persons possessing a land title as an individual could participate in New Zealand’s political life, but this form of land occupancy was foreign to Indigenous Peoples. This exclusion led to multiple wars between the colonizers and the Māori, to the point that the rule of the British Crown was threatened in the 1860s.38 In 1862, James Fitzgerald, Superintendent of the Colony of New Zealand, suggested that Māori chiefs should be allowed to participate fully in the political system.39 This idea laid the foundations for the structural measures that were implemented to ensure that the Māori are represented in the New Zealand Parliament.

In 1867, against the backdrop of major social and political tensions, the New Zealand government adopted the Māori Representation Act.40 It created four new electoral divisions specifically for male Māori candidates, separate from the existing electoral divisions.41 At the time, Europeans enjoyed 72 seats in the Parliament.42 According to lawyer Alexandra Xanthaki and political scientist Dominic O’Sullivan, at the time, the seats given to the Māori reflected their people’s distinctive character, which set them apart from other minority groups.43 Superintendent Donald McLean said that the Māori “should feel that the Legislature . . . was not closed against them.”44

However, the years that followed the adoption of the Act were marked by willful neglect in the management of the Māori electoral rights,45 in particular with respect to the criteria to acquire the right to vote, the voting process itself, candidates’ rights and the boundaries of electoral divisions.46 Those years were also marked by the overturning of the Treaty of Waitangi and an intense period of assimilation.47 Despite everything, these violations led to an affirmation movement that was born and peaked in the 1960s48 and paved the way for a process of decolonization and of reconciliation. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 was adopted, recognizing the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi once again.

The progress that New Zealand’s Indigenous people made with respect to political representation was also facilitated by the reform of the electoral system. In 1986, New Zealand established a Royal Commission to investigate its electoral system.49 The inquiry revealed that Māori voter turnout was higher in reserved electoral divisions than in general electoral divisions. It also highlighted the fact that the structural measures by which seats were reserved for the Māori are meaningful in ways that go beyond the issue of political representation. The measures are for the Māori “… a base for a continuing search for more appropriate constitutional and political forms through which Māori rights might be given effect.”

However, the report showed that while the Māori seats are necessary, these measures alone are insufficient. According to the commissioners, in a democratic system the protection of minorities should be the responsibility of the Parliament as a whole, and not just of the members belonging to the minority group. The commissioners concluded that the responsibility would never be shouldered unless Māori voters’ votes counted, in other words, unless the electoral result was proportional to the will expressed by the population as a whole. To achieve this, the report recommended that a mixed-member proportional system be adopted.

In 1992, a referendum was held in which 84.5 per cent of New Zealanders voted that the time had come to amend the electoral system.50 In 1993, the Parliament finally adopted the Electoral Act 1993. The 1996 election officially marked the replacement of the first-past-the-post electoral system by the mixed- member proportional system, a voting system that aims to preserve local representation while correcting the majority system’s harmful effects. Since the reform, 64 general seats and seven seats reserved for Māori are filled via first-past-the-post voting, while the remaining 49 seats are used to offset disproportionalities.

Reforming the electoral system and adopting structural measures has led to a significant increase in the number of Māori at the Parliament of New Zealand. Over the six elections held between 1996 and 2011, the number of Māori Members of Parliament rose by 16 per cent.51 In the September 2017 election, 28 Māori Members were elected, accounting for 23 per cent of the 120 seats in the Parliament of New Zealand. Moreover, they were not elected just from their reserved electoral divisions: half of the elected Māori Members were selected from party lists.52

According to some authors, integrating the Māori into New Zealand’s political institutions cannot lead to full representation of their interests, as the system comes from a European tradition, not a Māori one.53 But for the vast majority of authors and New Zealand citizens, Māori interests are best represented by Māori decision-makers.54 According to Professor Natacha Gagné, reforming the electoral system allowed New Zealand to break away from bi-partisanship and forced the formation of coalition governments, allowing third parties, like the Māori Party, to find a place in Parliament and in the government.55 Researchers also point out that introducing the new proportional system contributed to making the reserved seats even more valuable, as it led to the creation of new political parties and therefore greater competition for the Māori seats.56 

The health of New Zealand’s democratic system has been assessed using the Gallagher index. The index measures the difference between the percentage of votes each party gets and the percentage of seats each party gets.57 The higher the index, the worse the distortion of the electorate’s popular will. Experts compared the popular will distortion scores of New Zealand elections and found that the elections held from 1951 to 1993 under the first-past-the-post system scored 12.2, while those held from 1996 to 2017 under the proportional system scored 2.858. According to the Australasian Study of Parliament Group and political scientist Therese Arseneau, the main lesson that can be gleaned from New Zealand’s experiences is that “there is a close connection between type of electoral system and the election of more representative legislatures”.59

III. Legal Avenues That Can Be Implemented at the Assemblée nationale du Québec

An electoral system reflects the values, traditions and aspirations of a people. It is never neutral, for each country or nation designs its voting system in its own way to match its ambitions.60 When it comes time to replacing an electoral system, we first need to understand the consequences for democracy: the societal issues that “governments prioritize are related to our electoral system.”61 In a majoritarian system, when a single party with its own vision wins unshared power, it is at the cost of excluding other visions.62 Québec’s voting system is a direct result of its British colonial heritage, and it has been accepted without debate, by universal consent,63 but according to many observers, it offers only a sham of democratic government.64

According to the Ligue des droits et libertés, the electoral system can contribute to indirect exclusion in Québec because it does not result in an accurate representation of the electorate in the Assemblée nationale.65 Not only does the electoral system have repercussions in terms of the appeal of seeking elected positions, it also has an impact on whether or not the population supports the decisions made on its behalf.66 In a reconciliation process with Indigenous Peoples, it is legitimate to ask whether the current electoral system fosters their effective representation in Québec’s democratic institutions.67

During the 42nd Legislature, Bill 39, An Act to establish a new electoral system, was introduced in 2019, but died on the Order Paper. It stated that Québec’s electoral system “must aim to achieve effective representation of electors and offer equal participation for all in the electoral process.” However, it did not contain any specific provisions to ensure better Indigenous representation. The briefs submitted during the Committee on Institutions’ special consultations and public hearings all mentioned Indigenous communities’ absence from Québec’s democratic institutions.68 Reforming the electoral system could be a way to deal with this deficiency.

Since the 1970s, no fewer than seven parliamentary or para-governmental consultations have allowed Quebecers to assert their desire for change.69 Six reports tabled during these consultations, including one from the Chief Electoral Officer, have concluded that the current system must be replaced, and expressed a preference for the compensatory mixed proportional model. These reports show that the time has come for Québec’s electoral system to ensure that historically under-represented groups have access to positions as representatives that is commensurate with their share of the polity.70 Making democratic progress in this way will result in Québec’s society benefitting from the expertise that the shortcomings of its political system have deprived it of. In order to enrich Québec democracy, respect Indigenous Peoples’ founding role, and recognize their unique relationship with institutions that are not their own, the integration of these communities into the Québec parliamentary system must be at the heart of discussions on electoral reform.

When it comes to representation, it is also essential to consider the obstacles that are greater for some members of our society. Structural measures are intended to provide a way to overcome these obstacles, to find collective answers to what appear to be individual needs and to force or encourage the political parties to adapt and pave the way for all members of the electorate.71

To begin with, the New Zealand experience shows that the structural measure establishing reserved electoral divisions has at least guaranteed that these communities will have Members of Parliament they can identify with, who can make their claims heard and who can advocate for issues they understand better than anyone else. In 1984, the Québec Grand Council of the Crees submitted a brief to the committee studying electoral representation, namely, the Commission de la représentation électorale, asking for the appointment of an Indigenous representative to the Assemblée nationale or the creation of an electoral division bringing together the Cree, Inuit and Naskapi in northern Québec. This measure could be implemented in Québec by establishing lists consisting only of people from Indigenous communities according to the territory where they live. Around the world, nine countries, including New Zealand, have adopted structural measures of this type to improve Indigenous representation, and data from 2014 show that Indigenous representation averages 11 per cent in these countries’ Parliaments, compared with only 4 per cent in countries that have not adopted such measures.72

Next, Division IV of Chapter VI of the Election Act, which provides for the reimbursement of election expenses, could be amended. Financial initiatives, such as an increase in reimbursement of election expenses, a subsidy for political parties that get members of Indigenous communities elected and a subsidy for those that present concrete action plans to fight against under-representation of Indigenous people could encourage the parties to have more members from these communities run as candidates. The Québec legisature could also impose financial sanctions to be imposed on parties that fail to comply with the measures or do not achieve the objectives that have been set. In the event of an electoral system reform, the Election Act could also provide for an alternation of Indigenous candidates in the parties’ lists, which would help diversify the political class.73

In the end, these measures are merely suggestions, and it is up to the stakeholders to choose what would work best for them. On this issue, the example of Nova Scotia clearly illustrates that it cannot be assumed that the main stakeholders will consider this option the most advantageous for their nation. In that province, subsection 1 of section 6 of the House of Assembly Act (R.S.N.S. 1989 (1992 Supp.), c. 1) states that province’s intention to reserve a seat for a member of the Mi’kmaq nation since 1992, but the seat has never been filled. Comprised of multiple communities headed by different band councils, the Mi’kmaq consider that their interests cannot be represented by one single individual, and that their claims are best defended by their respective chiefs. They also explain that the treaties they signed are with the Crown, not the province of Nova Scotia, and that they should therefore engage in dialogue directly with the federal government. For these communities, occupying a seat in the provincial legislature would deny the significance of the treaties.74

Structural measures must not aim to undermine the legitimacy of the existing institutions in Indigenous communities, but, on the contrary, serve as a springboard for those communities’ participation in government, so that they can vote on legislation and their specific issues can enjoy greater visibility.

Conclusion

For Indigenous people, the federal system and the Indian Act have created ambiguity between Canadian and Québec institutions. Indigenous communities’ distrust of States’ political structures comes from being treated as an object to be ruled over instead of a subject of law and from having had elections imposed as a way to determine who governs. As a result, these nations have tried to establish their own forms of governance on the sidelines of the state framework and have participated very little in Québec’s electoral process.

The New Zealand example illustrates that it is possible to reconcile a desire for self-determination and affirmation of Indigenous specificity within the same democratic space. To achieve this, the reconciliation process requires “effective indigenization”75 of every fiber of the Québec State through mutual commitment to a common future. For that, the political and legal orders must be reworked so that they represent the aspirations of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous citizens.76

If the authority of government is rooted in the will of the people, should democracy not belong to all citizens and allow all to take an equal part in collective decisions? The majority of decisions affecting all Quebecers are currently made without any input from Indigenous people. As the “people’s house,” the Assemblée nationale must strive towards better representation of society’s plurality of opinions.77

Notes

  1. Oleh Protsyk et al., The representation of minorities and indigenous peoples in parliament, (Mexico: Interparliamentary   Union, UNDP, 2010), p. 23, French version cited in Audrée Ross, La représentation politique des Premières Nations du Québec, (Québec: Fondation Jean-Charles Bonenfant, Assemblée nationale du Québec, 2014), p. 26.
  2. Anne-Marie Lefebvre, La représentation autochtone au sein des institutions politiques nationales d’ici et d’ailleurs : les cas du Canada, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et de la Fennoscandie (Ottawa: Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitey of Ottawa, 2013), p. 2.
  3. Alain Beaulieu and Stéphane Béreau, Les Autochtones et le politique (Montréal: Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la question territoriale autochtone, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2012), p. 46, URL: <http://www. territoireautochtone.uqam.ca/pages/documents/ publications/Les_Autochtones_et_politique.pdf>, cited by A. Ross, op. cit., p. 47.
  4. John Borrows, Recovering Canada: the resurgence of Indigenous law, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), pp. 17–38 cited in Simon Dabin, La participation des Autochtones aux institutions démocratiques canadiennes, Ph.D. thesis (Montréal: Department of Political Science, Université de Montréal, 2021), , p. 113.
  5. Chantal Bernier, “La négociation de l’autonomie politique des autochtones du Québec et le droit international”, (1984) 1 Revue québécoise de droit international, 359, URL: <https://www.persee.fr/doc/ rqdi_0828-9999_1984_num_1_1_1595>, p. 361.
  6. [1973] R.C.S. 313, p. 328.
  7. Ghislain Otis, “Élection, gouvernance traditionnelle et droits fondamentaux chez les peuples autochtones du Canada”, (2004) 49 Revue de droit de McGill 393, p. 396.
  8. Ibid., citing Olive Patricia Dickason, Les premières nations, (Sillery:  Éditions du Septentrion, 1996)65–66.
  9. S. Dabin, p. 25.
  10. G. Otis, p. 397.
  11. Martin Papillon, “Segmented Citizenship: Indigenous Peoples and the Limits of Universality”, in Daniel Béland, Gregory Marchildon and Michael J. Prince, Eds., Universality and social policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), pp. 137–54 cited in S. Dabin, p. 27.
  12. G. Otis, p. 404.
  13. Encyclopédie Canadienne, “Loi sur les Indiens”, updated by Zach Parrott, 23 September 2022, online: < https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/fr/article/loi- sur-les-indiens>.
  14. Wayne Daugherty and Dennis Madill, Indian government under Indian Act legislation, 1868–1951, (Ottawa: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980), Part I.
  15. John Leclair, Les droits ancestraux en droit constitutionnel canadien : quand l’identitaire chasse le politique (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2013), p. 304.
  16. Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay and Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 6th ed.,, (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2014), para. VI-2.251.
  17. Sébastien Grammond, “Pour l’inclusion des droits des peuples autochtones dans la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne. Hors-série. La Charte québécoise : origines, enjeux et perspectives”, (2006) 66.5 Revue du Barreau 295, p. 300.
  18. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, para. 177 ; R. v. Morris, 2006 SCC 59, para. 90.
  19. Bruce Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations”, (1991) 36 McGill Law Journal 308.
  20. S. Grammond, p. 301.
  21. Robert Adamonski, Dorothy Chunn and Robert Menzies, Contesting Canadian Citizenship: Historical Readings, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) cited in S. Dabin, p. 26.
  22. S. Grammond, p. 301.
  23. Public Inquiry Commission on relations between Indigenous Peoples and certain public services in Québec: listening, reconciliation and progress, Final report, Québec, 2019, p. 73, URL: https://www.cerp. gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_clients/Rapport/Final_ report.pdf.
  24. S. Dabin, cited in Sandrine Vieira and Simon Gionet, “Pourquoi les communautés autochtones votent-elles peu aux élections provinciales ?”, Le Devoir, September 10, 2022. URL: <https://www.ledevoir.com/politique/ quebec/753528/elections-quebec-2022-pourquoi-les- communautes-autochtones-votent-elles-peu-aux- elections-provinciales>.
  25. Public Inquiry Commission on relations between Indigenous Peoples and certain public services in Québec: listening, reconciliation and progress, p. 218.
  26. Pierre Trudel, Ghislain Picard. Entretiens, (Montréal: Éditions Boréal, 2009).
  27. S. Vieira and S. Gionet.
  28. Kiera L. Ladner and Michael McCrossan, The Electoral Participation of Aboriginal People, Elections Canada: Working Paper Series on Electoral Participation and Outreach Practices, Ottawa, 2007, p. 12. Online: https:// www.elections.ca/res/rec/part/paper/aboriginal/ aboriginal_e.pdf
  29. S. Vieira and S. Gionet.
  30. Ibid..
  31. Ibid.
  32. Mercédez Roberge, Des élections à réinventer, un pouvoir à partager (Montréal: Éditions Somme toute, 2019), p. 20.
  33. Natacha Gagné, “Mode de scrutin, représentation des autochtones dans les institutions parlementaires et décolonisation. L’exemple néo-zélandais”, (2020) 50 Recherches amérindiennes au Québec 187, p. 188.
  34. Marie-France Chabot, “Le Tribunal de Waitangi et les droits des autochtones,” (1991) 32(1) Les Cahiers de droit 59, p. 63.
  35. New Zealand Parliamentary Library, The Origins of the Māori Seats (Research papers, New-Zealand Parliament, 2018).
  36. Natacha Gagné and Marie Salaün, Visages de la souveraineté en Océanie, Programmes Jeunes Chercheurs, Jeunes Chercheuses : Les peuples du Pacifique insulaire et l’État (Cahiers du Pacifique Sud contemporain, L’Harmattan, 2010), p. 139.
  37. New Zealand Parliamentary Library, p. 3.
  38. N. Gagné, p. 188.
  39. New Zealand History, “James Edward Fitzgerald”, online: <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/people/james-e- fitzgerald>.
  40. 31 Victoriae 1867 No 47 (N.Z.).
  41. A.-M., Lefebvre, p. 7.
  42. Rawiri Taonui, “Ngā māngai – Māori representation – Representation in Parliament”, Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, URL: <https://teara.govt.nz/en/ zoomify/33905/maori-representation-act-1867>.
  43. Alexandra Xanthaki and Dominic O’Sullivan, “Indigenous Participation in Elective Bodies. The Maori in New Zealand”, (2009) 16(2) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, p. 191 cited in N. GAGNÉ, p. 190.
  44. New Zealand Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, 1867, Vol. 1, pp. 336 and 458.
  45. Neil Atkinson, Adventures in Democracy: A History of the Vote in New Zealand (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2003), p. 172.
  46. New Zealand Parliament.
  47. N. Gagné, 188; M.-F. Chabot, p. 67.
  48. Ibid.
  49. Royal Commission On The Electoral System, The Nature and Basis of Maori Representation in Parliament, URL: <https://elections.nz/assets/Report-of-the-Royal- Commission-on-the-Electoral-System-1986/Chapter-3- maori-representation-v2.pdf>.
  50. Perspective Monde, “Tenue d’un référendum sur le mode de scrutin en Nouvelle-Zélande”, Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de l’Université de Sherbrooke, URL: <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/ bilan/servlet/BMEve/821>.
  51. Therese Arseneau, The Impact of MMP on Representation in New Zealand’s Parliament. A view from outside Parliament, Convenor, New Zealand Branch ASPG, URL: <https://www.aspg.org.au/wp- content/uploads/2017/08/ Session-2-Dr-Therese-Arseneau-The-Impact-of-MMP- on-Representation-in-New-Zealands-Parliament.pdf.>.
  52. M. Roberge, p. 211.
  53. A.-M., Lefebvre, p. 11.
  54. Catherine J. Iorns-Magallanes, “Indigenous Political Representation:  Identified Parliamentary Seats as a Form of Indigenous Self-determination”, in Barbara Ann Hocking, Unfinished Constitutional Business? Rethinking Indigenous Self-determination (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2005), p. 110 cited in A.-M., Lefebvre, p. 11.
  55. Ibid.
  56. T. Arseneau.
  57. M. Roberge, p. 378.
  58. Ibid., p. 177.
  59. T. Arseneau.
  60. CSN, mémoire présenté le 17 janvier 2020 par la Confédération des syndicats nationaux à la Commission des Institutions sur le projet de loi no 39, Loi établissant un nouveau mode de scrutin, 7.
  61. M. Roberge, p. 20.
  62. Ibid.
  63. Ibid., p. 253 citing Arthur Sauvé, see Journaux de l’Assemblée législative de la province de Québec, vol. LVI, 17 mars 1922, URL : <https://www.assnat.qc.ca/ fr/travaux-parlementaires/assemblee-nationale/15-3/ journal-debats/19220317/91777.html>, p. 325.
  64. Ibid.
  65. Diane Lamoureux, “La réforme du mode de scrutin_: un enjeu démocratique et de droits humains”, Ligue des droits et Libertés, September 27, 2002.
  66. M. Roberge, p. 73.
  67. D. Lamoureux.
  68. Marc-André Bodet, mémoire présenté à la commission des institutions de l’Assemblée nationale du Québec dans le cadre des consultations sur le projet de loi 39.
  69. M. Roberge, p. 293.
  70. Ibid., p. 309.
  71. Ibid., p. 324.
  72. Ibid, p. 195.
  73. Ibid., p. 312.
  74. Sandra Hannebohm, “Off Script: Mi’kmaq Representation in Province House – The 52nd Seat”, Springtide Off Script: Atlantic Canada Politics Podcast, episode 9, online: <https://www.springtide.ngo/off- script-mikmaq-representation-in-province-house-the- 52nd-seat-episode-9/>, consulted on June 15, 2024.
  75. Joyce Green, “Autodétermination, citoyenneté et fédéralisme : pour une relecture autochtone du palimpseste canadien”, (2004) 23 Politique et Sociétés 9.
  76. Ibid.
  77. Yvan Bordeleau, L’éducation à la citoyenneté guérira-t-elle la démocratie? (Montréal: Les Éditions XYZ inc., 2022), p. 56 ; CSN.
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